Determinism and a Category Mistake: Divine Decree and Human Agency
Note: This was presented during the Aurandt Lectures on Theology at Christ Reformed Church of Alexandria, Pennsylvania on March 21, 2026. Christ Reformed Church is a confessionally Presbyterian church, which means that this article deals primarily with the Westminster Confession of Faith; however, as explained in both the body and footnotes, all Reformed confessions agree with the thesis.
Introduction
One of the most frequent objections to Calvinism and Reformed Theology is that of an accusation of mechanical or causal divine determinism—i.e., Reformed Theology reveals a God who mechanically chooses all things to such an extent that mankind has no capability of doing otherwise. It is then argued that if God so chooses all things in such a way that mankind has no capability of doing otherwise, then it is unfair or unjust for God to judge mankind as sinful. This accusation against Reformed Theology, which is argued for in defense of libertarian freedom of the will, often caricaturizes or at least flattens what Reformed Theology actually affirms concerning God’s decrees, human agency or culpability, and the nature of realty in general. The issue is that the accusation of divine determinism in the form of mechanical or causal determinism against Reformed Theology commits a logical fallacy—i.e., accusing Reformed Theology of causal determinism is a category mistake (i.e., the accusation misunderstands what is meant by decree and as such, posits an unwarranted argument against Reformed Theology).[1]
In particular, those who accuse Reformed Theology of divine mechanistic or causal determinism make a presuppositional category error—i.e., what skeptics of Reformed Theology accuse Reformed Theology of is not what Reformed Theology teaches or argues for in general. In making this category error, opponents often strawman the Reformed position and refuse to give Reformed Christians the opportunity to defend their own position.[2]
When properly understood, Reformed Theology does not present the mechanistic determinism that opponents often accuse it of, but rather, Reformed Theology presents a divine determinism that is compatible with God’s sovereignty and human responsibility. This paper explains what the Westminster Confession of Faith (WCF) means concerning divine decree, predestination, and free will to offer a better understanding of divine determinism and human responsibility. It does this by first explaining the WCF’s understanding of divine decree, showing the accusation posited against Reformed Theology by both unbelievers and non-Reformed Christians before showing how the accusation itself is a category mistake. The paper then concludes by highlighting again what the WCF means and how it bolsters Christians in their faith today.[3]
Defining Determinism and Free Will
With any academic study, it is important to define and understand key ideas otherwise one runs the risk of talking past another person. In the present study, definitions of terminologies are vastly different and are often conflated to fit the needs of the conversation. In this study, understanding determinism and free will is absolutely vital to having an intelligible conversation because there are differing ideas concerning determinism and free will; and there is a spectrum across the definitions of determinism and free will that philosophers and theologians debate on. With that said, determinism is very loosely defined as the notion that events in the world are pre-determined or fixed in some manner or another.[4] Again, understood on a spectrum of softer determinism and harder determinism—where one side carries elements of a pre-determined or fixed world and the other side conversely carries a strict understanding of everything being pre-determined or fixed. When we discuss free will, the primary idea that we have at hand is in contrast to that of determinism—i.e., does mankind act of their own accord or volition and if so, by how much?[5] It is important to note, that this paper assumes a definition of free will that is not identical to what is often termed libertarian free will or the belief that free will needs to be absolutely free from any sort of outside influence for it to be genuine free will—in fact, this paper assumes that libertarian free will is not actually possible. In both cases—determinism vs. free will, there is a spectrum of responses that has extended several millennia in both Christian and non-Christian groups.[6]
Of course, these concepts of free will and determinism seep into the Church in discussions concerning divine sovereignty and human responsibility.[7] In particular, it is worth considering the thoughts of Pelagius and Augustine as they pertain to divine sovereignty and human free will. Pelagius taught that God never commands impossible things for man to perform and thus, believed that mankind had the capability of obedience even unto salvation—i.e., God commands people to believe; thus, they must have the power to believe without the aid of grace.[8] Pelagius’ objection to divine sovereignty was primarily due to his presupposition that God would never command nor demand impossible things. Of course, in contrast to Pelagius, Augustine believed that mankind possessed a free will that is able to make voluntary decisions without external constraint or coercion; except his free will is enslaved to the person’s desire—i.e., a sinner is free to act according to his own desire, but his desires are corrupt until the Spirit works within him to enable and transform the will.[9] Many positions fall between Augustine and Pelagius (including semi-Pelagianism) by affirming different forms of human free will and divine sovereignty.
As previously stated, this paper primarily concerns itself with the accusation of mechanistic or causal determinism, which is often applied to Reformed Theology by those holding to differing views of God’s sovereignty and human freedom.[10] Critics of Reformed Theology both in philosophy and theology have often argued that the doctrine of divine sovereignty entails a necessary form of causal or mechanistic determinism; however, the Reformed tradition itself has not only repeatedly denied such accusations, but has also warned against a causal or mechanistic determinism from within.[11] For example, in his Studies in Dogmatics, Berkouwer states argues that identifying the election of God with a causal-deterministic system is a fatal misinterpretation, “which [robs] the message of election of its comforting character.”[12] The desire to distance Reformed Theology from causal determinism is seen in Hoekema, Berkhof, Bavinck, Van Til, Muller, and others.[13] The critique of causal or mechanistic determinism against Reformed Theology does exist; however, many Reformed theologians actively resist the accusation.
Thus stated, a definition of mechanistic or causal determinism is necessary before continuing. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Causal determinism is . . . the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature.”[14] Stanford clarifies later that determinism means that “the world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.”[15] Causal determinism means that everything that occurs has no means or way of changing—everything is fixed; and thus, there can be no concept of human free will or human agency. It is worth noting that there are some Reformed Christians who do believe in causal determinism in this manner—e.g., Jonathan Edwards in his Freedom of the Will utilizes a Platonic understanding of the universe to argue that since all we see in the world around us are shadows of the real forms, then that which projects the shadows chooses to do deterministically.[16] However, the modern concept of causal determinism did not exist when the Reformed confessions were written—it developed approximately during the same time period of the authoring of the confessions, but it was not the primary framework of belief or thought while the confessions were written. In fact, during the 17th century, men like Rene Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, and Baruch Spinoza were still developing the ideas that would eventually birth causal determinism, but to do so, they reconceived nature, rejected Aristotelian formal and final causes, and started explaining events through antecedent physical states—i.e., their understanding of metaphysics had so drastically changed that they were not operating in the same framework that the authors of the Reformed confessions were.[17] In reality, although mechanistic models of causation were emerging in the 17th century, the Westminster divines operated within a scholastic framework that had not been displaced by the developments of Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza; and while the trajectory of the philosophers tended toward causal determinism, the confessions were not written with those ideas in mind.[18]Reading the confessions through the framework of medieval scholasticism rather than early modern rationalism confirms this.
Divine Decree in the Westminster Confession of Faith[19]
In 3.1 of the WCF, the Westminster Divines write that “God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass.”[20] If this was the end of 3.1, the typical accusation of causal determinism against Reformed Theology stands; however, the very next sentence places parameters, “yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.”[21] And in these parameters, ideas of freedom of will, contingency, and second causes still exists—all of which are metaphysical ideas that reveal what exactly the Westminster Divines meant. This concept of divine decree is explained as something that occurs not because God “foresaw it as future,” but rather because He indeed decreed it; and then the concept is applied to salvation and eternity before a note in 3.8 requiring special prudence and care concerning this doctrine.[22]
Perhaps with just ch. 3, the accusation of mechanistic or causal determinism could still stand; though, it would necessitate a misunderstanding of liberty, contingency, and second causes. However, ch. 9 expounds on the issue by expressing what Reformed Christians believe about free will:
God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that is neither forced, nor, by any absolute necessity of nature, determined to good, or evil. Man, in his state of innocency, had freedom, and power to will and to do that which was good and well pleasing to God; but yet, mutably, so that he might fall from it. Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation: so as, a natural man, being altogether averse from that good, and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto. When God converts a sinner, and translates him into the state of grace, he freeth him from his natural bondange under sin; and, by his grace alone, enables him freely to will and to do that which is spiritually good; yet so, as that by reason of his remaining corruption, he doth not perfectly, nor only, will that which is good, but doth also will that which is evil. The will of man is made perfectly and immutably free to good alone, in the state of glory alone.[23]
Chs. 10, 11, 12, 14, and 15 then build on the concept of divine decree by applying it to that of effectual calling, justification, adoption, saving faith, and repentance unto life. And the idea is rather simple, that in God’s eternal decree, He has predestined His own people, but those whom He has predestined still “come most freely” by answering His call and embracing the grace offered and conveyed in it.[24] Throughout the Reformed confessions, God’s sovereignty and providence are never put at odds with human free will or responsibility—the ideas are not exclusive, they are compatible even if they seem paradoxical from human standards.
Divine Decree in the Westminster Longer and Shorter Catechisms
Of course, the Westminster Longer and Shorter catechisms help in understanding this doctrine—particularly questions 12-23, which all pertain to the Decrees of God. For our purposes, questions 14, 18, and 20 give insight into the issue at hand:
Q14, How [does] God execute his decrees? A. God [executes] his decrees in the works of creation and providence . . . Q18, What are God’s works of providence? A. God’s works of providence are his most holy, wise, and powerful preserving and governing all his creatures; ordering them, all their actions, to his own glory . . . [and] Q20, What was the providence of God toward man in the estate in which he was created? A. The providence of God toward man in the estate in which he was created, was the placing him in paradise, appointing him to dress it, giving him liberty to eat of the fruit of the earth; putting the creatures under his dominion, and ordaining marriage for his help; affording him communion with himself; instituting the Sabbath; entering into a covenant of life with him, upon condition of personal, perfect, and perpetual obedience, of which the tree of life was a pledge; and forbidding to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, upon the pain of death.[25]
The concept, of course, is identical to what the WCF and really all Reformed confessions state—that somehow, the concepts of God’s decree, His ordaining of all things that come to be, human free will, and human responsibility all work in such a way that defining Reformed Theology as mechanistic or causal determinism rejects its own articulation of doctrine. Essentially, to argue that the Reformed understanding of Divine Decree, predestination, and free will is causally deterministic ignores what Reformed Theology actually teaches and commits a category mistake while creating a strawman.
In fact, when these ideas are considered within the corpus of Reformed confessions, the rejection of causal determinism is abundantly clear—e.g., the Belgic Confession, Article 13 states that nothing happens without God’s orderly arrangement and yet, “God is not the author of, and cannot be charged with, the sin that occurs. For His power and goodness are so great and incomprehensible that he arranges and does his work very well and justly even when devils and wicked people act unjustly.”[26] The Second Helvetic Confession explains these ideas over chapters 6, 8 and 9, “We believe that all things . . . are preserved and governed by the providence of this wise, eternal, and almighty God [however] God is not the author of sin . . . the cause of sin is the will of the devil and of man [and also] man does not do good or evil by compulsion, but willingly.”[27] The Heidelberg Catechism specifically states that all things “come to us not by chance but by his fatherly hand” and such, we ought to “be patient in adversity, thankful in prosperity” and to have good confidence in the future—i.e., while there is not an expounded “yet” section, it is heavily implied.[28]
Understanding the Reformed Position Concerning Divine Decree and Human Agency
Despite the accusations against Reformed Theology, what is expressed through the confessions is not a mechanistic or causal determinism. It is a form of determinism, but it very clearly is not mechanistic or causal determinism as these “harder” forms of determinism have no understanding or place for the different ideas of causesimplicitly understood in the confessions by the authors of the confession. Mechanistic or causal determinism understands the nature of the universe as having a fixed end that rejects any form of human agency. In modern philosophy, mechanistic or causal determinism insists that the past and the laws of nature all work together in such a way that everything in the future is unchangeable—there is no actual free will.[29] And yet, the confessions all insist that there is still human agency or free will that exists while simultaneously affirming God’s providence and divine decree. To accuse Reformed Theology of being deterministic in the mechanistic or causal sense rejects what the confessions themselves state; and really, the same mechanistic or causal determinism is rejected by most Reformed Theologians as well. And in accusing Reformed Theologians of believing in this sort of hard determinism misses the nuanced reality concerning divine decree and human agency in the confessions—i.e., the accusers are committing a category error based on a straw man rather than interacting with what Reformed Theology actually teaches and the proof of this is in WCF 3.1.
What Does the Confession Mean Concerning Contingency of Second Causes?
The accusation of causal determinism against Reformed Theology insists on an anachronistic understanding of determinism, contingency, causes, and liberty. The issue is that the confessions were not written with those definitions, but assumes an Aristotelian-scholastic understanding of determinism, contingency, causes, and liberty. When the confession states that “God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so, . . . violence [is not] offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away,” the Westminster Divines are appealing to a certain metaphysical ideas—and this is the key to properly understanding what was intended.
Aristotle explained causes in a multi-layered, non-competitive explanatory structure—i.e., causation exists in a structure in which a singular event can have multiple explanatory causes operating at different levels of explanation.[30]Within this framework, Aristotle distinguishes between material, formal, efficient, and final causes, not as competing forces, but as different kinds of explanations that can all account for a single effect. In Aristotle’s metaphysical concept, the material cause refers to the material or substance something is made of, the formal cause deals with the structure, shape, or essence that defines the thing, the efficient cause is the primary source of change or rest (i.e., the agent that brings something into existence), and the final cause is the teleological end of the thing.
Confessional understandings of causation, which were built on scholastic understandings of causation, utilize this same kind of non-competitive, multi-layered structure but develop it within a theological doctrine of creation and divine providence.[31] This development does not consist in simply identifying God with each of Aristotle’s causes. Rather, the confessional tradition distinguishes between orders of causation. God is the primary cause, not as one efficient cause among others, but as the transcendent ground who creates, sustains, and orders all things. Creation, by contrast, functions as secondary causes, which are real and operative causes within the created order, acting according to their own natures, whether necessarily, freely, or contingently. The distinction is essential as primary causation does not operate on the same ontological level as secondary causation and therefore does not compete with it. God’s decree is not an efficient cause within the world, as though it were one causal factor alongside others determining events in a mechanistic fashion. Rather, the decree establishes and orders the entire causal structure within which secondary causes operate. Thus, a singular effect can be fully grounded in God’s decree while also being fully produced through creaturely agency, without collapsing into the other.
This contrasts with modern ontological assumptions about causality, which tend to flatten causation into a single, univocal plane—i.e., in scholastic and Reformed ontology, a singular effect can be fully caused by both a primary and secondary cause without those causes existing in competition or on the same ontological level; and this is precisely how the confessions utilize the idea of causes. This is how the confessions can state that God is the one who providentially decrees all without Him necessarily being the cause of evil and while retaining human agency within the causal order. Without the scholastic and Reformed understanding of causality, the accusation of causal or mechanistic determinism stands—i.e., to fully appreciate the confession’s teaching concerning divine decree and human agency, scholastic and Reformed metaphysics need to be assumed; and when scholastic and Reformed metaphysics is rejected, misunderstandings concerning divine decree and human agency abound.
How Modern Accusations Against Reformed Theology Result in a Category Error
This is precisely where the accusation of mechanistic or causal determinism against Reformed Theology results in a category error. The issue at hand is not merely a disagreement over the strength or extent of causation, but a disagreement over the kind of causation described. In modern discussions of determinism, causation is treated as univocal and operating on a single ontological plane—i.e., all causes are understood as efficient causes within the created order, such that if one cause fully determines an event, all other causes are either reducible to it or rendered illusory. However, this is not the metaphysical framework assumed by the Reformed confessions. Rather, the confessions presuppose a distinction between different orders of causation—i.e., creaturely actions that proceed according to their own natures, whether necessarily, freely, or contingently. The forms of causation are not competing causes operating alongside one another within the same ontological order; instead, they are categorically distinct.
This distinction is critical as the divine decree is not an efficient cause within the created order, as though God were one cause among many in the same way that prior physical states determine later ones. Rather, the decree is the metaphysical ground that establishes and orders the entire causal structure within which secondary causes operate. Thus, when the confessions affirm that God has ordained whatsoever comes to pass while simultaneously affirming the liberty and contingency of second causes, they are not positing two competing explanations of the same event. Instead, they are affirming that a single effect can be fully accounted for at different ontological levels—i.e., grounded in the divine decree and produced through real creaturely agency.
At this point, the accusation of mechanistic or causal determinism results in a category error. Critics who charge Reformed Theology with determinism assume that divine decree functions as an efficient cause within the same ontological order as creaturely causes. On that assumption, if God determines all things, then creaturely agency must be either coerced or illusory. However, this assumption imports a metaphysical framework foreign to the confessions themselves. The error, then, is not simply a misdescription of how causation operates within Reformed theology, but a misidentification of what kind of causation is being described. By treating divine decree as if it were an efficient cause rather than a transcendent grounding cause, critics collapse two distinct categories of causation into one. The result is an argument that does not actually address the confession’s position but rather reconstructs the Reformed position in the manner of a strawman of that position within a different metaphysical system altogether.
In other words, by reading modern metaphysical concepts onto the Reformed confessions, critics of Reformed Theology’s understanding of divine decree and human agency commit a logical fallacy by arguing for ideas that Reformed Theologians themselves would also disagree with. In doing so, critics have invented an ideology of determinism that simply cannot be imported onto the confessions.
When the confessions are understood in conjunction with their own metaphysical framework, the concepts of divine decree and human agency are expressed in such a way that gives confessional Christians a more robust understanding of the universe surrounding them while also giving them a stronger understanding of who God is and what He has decreed from eternity past. When understood properly, the confession’s doctrine concerning divine decree and human agency preserves divine transcendence, reframes ordination, strengthens theodicy, affirms human agency, and explains effectual calling without coercion. When understood properly, this doctrine pieces together otherwise seemingly problematic ideas.
Conclusion
This paper has confronted a modern critique of Reformed Theology utilizing analytical philosophical method. In doing so, it has shown that the accusation of mechanical or causal determinism against Reformed Theology is the result of placing a foreign understanding of metaphysics onto the confessions themselves—i.e., instead of reading the confessions as they were intended to be read, critics change the doctrines based on their preconceived notions of determinism and libertarian free will. When rightly understood within its own metaphysical context, Reformed Theology provides a robust understanding of God’s sovereignty and providence while still giving room for human agency.
[1] The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy explains “a category mistake arises when things or facts of one kind are presented as if they belonged to another.” Simon Blackburn, “category mistake,” The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 74; The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives multiple examples of category mistakes, e.g., “the number two is blue,” “the theory of relativity is eating breakfast,” or “green ideas sleep furiously.” Ofra Magidor, “Category Mistakes,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2025 Edition), eds. Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (Stanford, CA: Metaphysics Research Lab of Stanford University, 2025), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/category-mistakes/#ImplForMeta.
[2] See William Lane Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology: Prolegomena, On Scripture, On Faith (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2025), 107-167 and 294-306, particularly concerning his understanding of Reformed Theology’s position concerning the inspiration of the Bible and his Systematic Philosophical Theology: On God: Attributes of God (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2025), 185-284, which deals with divine foreknowledge and future contingencies.
[3] It is worth noting that the issues of determinism and free will extend beyond that of theology—i.e., unbelievers are also wrestling with the concepts that are wrestled with in this paper.
[4] Carl Hoefer, “Causal Determinism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2024 Edition), eds. Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (Stanford, CA: Metaphysics Research Lab of Stanford University, 2025), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/determinism-causal/.
[5] Timothy O’Connor and Christopher Franklin, “Free Will,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), eds. Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (Stanford, CA: Metaphysics Research Lab of Stanford University, 2022), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/freewill/.
[6] See Timothy O’Connor and Christopher Franklin, “Free Will” for a helpful survey of philosophical responses to the free will debate.
[7] This paragraph summarizes R.C. Sproul’s Willing to Believe: The Controversy Over Free Will (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1997). See the full work for more detail.
[8] Sproul, 32-35.
[9] Sproul, 63-64.
[10] An excellent resource for understanding the differing views concerning predestination and free will is David Basinger and Randall Basinger, Predestination and Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986).
[11] For accusations see William Lane Craig, “Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom,” in Four Views on Divine Providence, ed. Dennis W. Jowers (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011); Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996); Robert E. Olson, Against Calvinism (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011); and Jerry L. Walls and Joseph R. Dongell, Why I Am Not a Calvinist (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004),
[12] G.C. Berkouwer. Divine Election, Studies in Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1960), 307.
[13] See Anthony A. Hoekema, Saved by Grace (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989), 89-92; Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1938), 165-178; Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. 2: God and Creation. Translated by John Vriend (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 591-619; Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 2008), 54-56, 79, 241-246, 411-413; Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. 3: The Divine Essence and Attributes (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003).
[14] Carl Hoefer, “Causal Determinism.”
[15] Carl Hoefer, “Causal Determinism.”
[16] See Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957); see also Plato, The Republic, Book VII.
[17] To see the shift in philosophical and religious thinking see Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. IV: The Rationalists, Descartes to Leibniz (London, EN: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2003), 1-152, 205-263; Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol V: British Philosophy, Hobbes to Hume (London, EN: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2003), 1-51.
[18] To see the philosophical and theological reasoning and framework that governed the writings of the confessions see Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1992); William Ames, The Marrow of Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1968); Peter van Mastricht, Theoretical-Practical Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2018). Sources of these sorts show that the primary method of reasoning during the writing of the confessions was still scholastic rather than rationalist. And then, of course, see the continued arguments in this paper.
[19] While this paper focuses on the WCF due to its context (i.e., the Aurandt Lectures are hosted by a church that affirms the WCF), it is important to note that all Reformed confessions are nearly identical in their understanding of divine decree, predestination, human responsibility, etc. For sake of time, this paper does not mention every parallel instance.
[20] WCF, 3.1.
[21] WCF, 3.1.
[22] WCF, 3.2-3.8.
[23] WCF, 9.1-9.5.
[24] WCF, 10.1-10.2.
[25] Westminster Longer Catechism, Q14-21.
[26] Belgic Confession, Article 13.
[27] Second Helvetic Confession, 6, 8, and 9.
[28] Heidelberg Catechism, Q27 and Q28; see also the Thirty-Nine Articles, Article 17 and the London Baptist Confession of Faith, 3.1.
[29] See Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983); Carl Ginet, “Might We Have No Choice?” in Freedom and Determinism, edited by K. Lehrer (Random House, 1966); John Martin Fisher, The Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford, EN: Blackwell, 1994); Kadri Vihvelin, Causes, Laws, and Free Will (Oxford, EN: Oxford University Press, 2013) for modern explanations of determinism. See also Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 21; Baruch Spinoza, Ethics 1.29; and Pierre-Simon Laplace, Philosophical Essay on Probabilities for more historical explanations.
[30] Aristotle, Physics, II.3; Aristotle, The Metaphysics, Delta 2.
[31] Aquinas, Commentary on Metaphysics: Books 1-6, Bk. 2, L. 3-5; Michael J. Dodds, “Causality,” St. Andrews Encyclopaedia of Theology, Edited by Brendan N. Wolfe et al., (University of St. Andrews, 2022). https://www.saet.ac.uk/Christianity/Causality. Ignacio Silva, “Thomas Aquinas on Natural Contingency and Providence” In Abraham’s Dice: Chance and Providence in the Monotheistic Traditions (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 158-174.